# Asymmetries in Globalised Space: The Road Network in Palestine-Israel

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## Prologue

### *On the border between Jordan and Palestine-Israel, August 2002*

By the time we get to Amman, in Jordan, it's the middle of the night. Illuminated signs revolve in the desert blackness, randomly lighting up the parched land along the road leading from the airport to the house where we'll be spending the night. The glittering lights of exclusive nightclubs shine in the distance. We wake up early in the morning. A hard day of waiting and sun lies before us.

In order to come to Palestine with my wife Sandi and her parents, Anwar and Monira (all three with Palestinian passports), instead of taking the easy route via Tel Aviv which is barred to Palestinians, I decided to cross the border with them over what Jordanians call the King Hussein Bridge and the Israelis, the Allenby Bridge.

There are three border crossings between Jordan and Palestine: the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge is the closest one to Jerusalem. It's built on the lowest ground in the area, at the same level as the Dead Sea. During the trip, the heat rises and the air pressure drops; ears pop and sweat runs down as our bodies attempt to compensate. The taxi that has ventured into this inhospitable land is an old Mercedes with a dozen seats, dilapidated on any terrain.

Here we are now, on the Jordanian side of the border. In silence, we get out of the vehicle. Sandi and her parents walk off a few yards toward the entry point reserved to Palestinians.

Left on my own, my defenses naturally go up and my attention is more on the alert. A young

man takes the luggage from me and I automatically follow him. I wouldn't know where else to go and there aren't any signs with information written in a language I can decipher. The boy, around eighteen years old, takes me in front of a baggage track and sets the suitcases down on the rollers. He turns around, looks at me, and then leaves. It doesn't take a genius to understand that my next stop is some seats set in the shade, out of the merciless August sun. A few minutes later I hear a voice behind me. I follow it and find myself at passport control. Everything's in order.

After five minutes, I'm already in the no-man's land. A ribbon of asphalt, fenced along the edges, with signs warning of landmine fields. Up ahead, there's the Israeli checkpoint. Two young men with rifles dressed in camouflage make us get out of the bus to inspect it from top to bottom. A short time later they make us get on the bus again, but we only drive a few yards. Another checkpoint.

The Israeli flag flutters on top of the only hill rising out of the dry plateau. We're stopped for another half hour. I don't know why or what we're waiting for. All of a sudden, a barrier lifts up and we're free to pass over the Israeli border. A surreal expanse of green spreads out in front of our eyes: palm trees and flower beds. *Welcome to Israel*.

The border is not a line. It is a space with depth to it. The materials it's made out of are the same as the ones in cities, but used differently. Here, for example, a retaining wall made out of reinforced concrete serves as a barricade.

Inside the border, the rules are few but essential. All flows are strictly monitored and controlled. The border is a machine which tears apart everything that crosses it into separate, classifiable elements, only to put them back again together somehow or another when they exit. This applies to people, too, not just objects.

When I get off the bus, I'm greeted by some young soldiers who look like American teenagers,

with low-hung pants and baggy t-shirts. A female soldier comes up to me and asks me where I'm heading. "To Bethlehem," I answer. "Follow me, please," she says.

They take me out of the 'normal' line. I sit down and wait for the security staff. Another female soldier starts questioning me: where am I headed? Whose house am I going to? When will I be coming back? Where's my luggage? The same questions asked in different ways for half an hour.

When the interrogation finishes, another soldier shows me into a dressing room. Very courteously, he asks me to undress. He checks every single piece of my clothing, then goes out, taking my shoes with him. I find myself back where I started from, only shoeless. Two hours have already gone by since we got to the border and I wonder just how long we are going to have to stay here.

They take me into another room and ask me to open up the suitcases that are arranged on steel tables, like meat in a butcher's shop, easy to clean. Seated, I wait for every single thing I own to be inspected.

Truth be told, I was prepared for this treatment so I take it calmly, even when they tell me that my personal belongings may now be repacked after their vivisection: it's the same feeling you get when you come home to find a burglar has dropped by in your absence. You feel violated: your dirty laundry, your agenda lying open, everything that's been touched by other hands, the hands of complete strangers. I try not to lose my humanity, and with great calm and dignity I fold everything as if I am about to take my leave from a Grand Hotel. I will my gestures into slow motion, trying to be as refined as possible in spite of the vivisection lab I've wandered into.

This particular procedure is reserved to Palestinians and to anyone who has contact with them.

My clothes are now back in my suitcase. I think I've finally finished, but where's my passport?

They tell me I have to pick it up in an office near the exit: this is where I'm told to fill in yet another form, and I'm asked the same questions.

Four hours to cross the border. The border is not a line: you can't cross it by stepping over it.

Once I'm over the border, the heat clutches at my throat and the light is blinding. We bargain with a taxi driver over the fare for the trip. The discussion goes on longer than expected because there are problems reaching Bethlehem. To get there, you first have to pass through Jerusalem. That would be the easiest route in theory, but Palestinians are not authorised to go there. The taxi driver doesn't want to risk any of the rural routes because there might be roadblocks on them. We agree on a relay arrangement: the first taxi will take us as far as the outskirts of Jerusalem, and from there we'll have to get ourselves another ride.

Along the road, we come across colony settlements and Bedouin tents. Two opposite ways of using the territory: one sedentary, one nomadic. The settlements are fenced in by walls whose foundations are dug into the ground, while the Bedouin tents are perched on the surface of the land. Immobility versus motion. Controlled borders versus freedom of movement.

At 2:30 p.m. we're on the outskirts of Jerusalem. At 3 p.m., curfew starts. We have to hurry. Yet another checkpoint. We get out of the taxi in the middle of a line of vehicles packed tightly together. We jump into a new taxi that turns around and goes back for a bit over the same road we've just arrived on.

I'm starting to give up on the idea of ever making it there, when the genius of self-organisation suddenly comes into play. Whenever a new checkpoint is set up by the Israelis, the Palestinian taxi drivers respond by planning a new road to get around it. They take up a collection to lease a tractor and clear a few hundred yards with it: voilà, a new passage that circumvents the checkpoint. The soldiers know about it, but these are the crazed rules of the game and the Palestinians are forced to abide by them.

The taxi driver who's taking us on this part of the drive is a refugee; he risks receiving a fine that he wouldn't be able to pay and being arrested, but what can he do about it? It's the only way, he has to get by.

After a long series of twists and turns, we finally make it to the gates of Bethlehem. We get out of the car to find the entire family there to greet us. Our marriage, which had taken place a few weeks earlier in Rome, is celebrated in the family courtyard with singing and dancing. My thoughts turn for a second to the courtyards of Italy, lit by the blue glow of televisions, and to the same TV news story broadcast every year, about the mid-August exodus and counter-exodus and the bad weather that's ruining everybody's summer holidays.

***Four years later… on the border between Palestine-Israel and Jordan, August 2006***

Tala, my daughter, was born in Bethlehem on a beautiful spring morning in the month of February. She was born in a clinic built with funds from the Japanese government and tended by a Palestinian nurse who spoke perfect Neapolitan, learned during a long stay in Naples where he had studied.

After the first few days spent rejoicing in her arrival, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma: how is Tala going to be able to cross the border and get out of the Occupied Territories? How will the border machine work on her, with a Palestinian mother and an Italian father? If Tala leaves Bethlehem as an 'Italian' she'll only be able to come back as a tourist; if she leaves Bethlehem as a 'Palestinian' she'll be treated as such by the Israeli army, meaning she won't be able to move freely around the Occupied Territories and Israel.

The border machine is interactive architecture. It changes depending on the citizenship of the person who crosses over it. As a prototype of biopolitical architecture, maybe in its purest form, it becomes more or less porous depending on the nation it belongs to: it constructs and

deconstructs itself depending on the relationship that each individual has with the state, a regulating device that mediates between birth and nationhood.

By being half-Italian and half-Palestinian, Tala puts the pre-established spatial and political order into crisis, revealing the fiction of national belonging and all the politics that stem from it. The mere thought of having to face the device with her that awaits us on the Jordanian border, the only entry and exit point for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, is deeply disturbing to me. The idea of being forced to be stripped bare by the border machine makes almost any certainty you have about your rights and existence falter.

We hire the usual group taxi, a dilapidated yellow Mercedes. Concerns about the trip are magnified by the sense of uncertainty. How many times have I heard someone say that the real problem is not knowing what the rules are? At the beginning, I always used to say, "There must be someone who decides what you can and can't do!" Then I discovered that this void is a form of government.

Take the roads, for example. The Israeli army can decide for security reasons to block a given part of a road used on a daily basis by thousands of Palestinians. The blockade is enforced by deploying patrols, roadblocks and barriers. After a few months, even though the roadblocks have been removed, the Palestinians – fearful of running up against soldiers and being arrested – choose not to use the road anymore, thus leaving it to the exclusive use of the colonists.

This is what differentiates the rule of Israel in the Occupied Territories from South African apartheid. The separation here is not crudely imposed by 'Only White' signs, but rather by a much more sophisticated system ensuring that the prohibitions will be internalised. You will never find signs saying 'Forbidden to Palestinians – Reserved to Tourists and Colonists' along the roads used exclusively by colonists. The regime of prohibitions is implemented by verbal orders given by Israeli military officers who control a given area of the territory. Palestinians found on a road prohibited to them or for which they lack the required permit risk being put into

jail or having their vehicle confiscated. This is why Palestinians are forced to use group transportation vehicles that shuttle between one checkpoint and another.

The border machine is not located on state lines; rather, it acts on the boundaries of Palestinian cities and villages.

To ensure ourselves some likelihood of crossing the border into Jordan, which is only open a few hours a day, we set out from Bethlehem at 4:30 in the morning. Luckily, Tala is sleeping. We get through the first checkpoint, called the container, without any particular problems.

I'm the only Westerner in the bus, one of the few Westerners to take the roads reserved to Palestinians. The soldiers at the checkpoints have often asked me, "What the fuck are you doing here?" And I've always answered, "It's a long story, actually,…". To save themselves the boredom, they almost always let me through.

Having arrived as far as Abu Dis, I'm beginning to think that this is a charmed trip, with a remarkable lack of snags, when we suddenly come up against a mobile checkpoint. They stop us and tell us that we can't pass this way. The passengers start to get upset. They start shouting, waving airplane tickets departing from the Amman airport. The soldiers pretend they don't hear. There's no point in arguing.

Tense and irritated, the taxi driver turns the car around and after a few yards sets off down a back road through the countryside. Tala wakes up: the car is rocking a little too violently to be mistaken for a cradle. I hold her baby seat against my chest as tightly as I can. We cut across a beautiful field of ancient olive trees. After a short while, we're once again on the main road, with the soldiers behind us grinning from the checkpoint.

The road starts to go downhill and we gaze out the windows onto the extraordinary landscape of the hills of the Dead Sea, dotted by colonies and Bedouin camps. My thoughts turn toward the

nomadic city designed by Constant. I tell myself that its tragic dimension, rarely discussed, takes on concrete form in this place. I have always thought of Constant's *New Babylon* as a dystopia: the vision of a world in collapse, in constant conflict, not so much between nomads and sedentary peoples as between different conceptions of nomadism.

As I look out the car window, I recognise the encampments and the new colony expansions. Lost in my thoughts, I fail to notice that, instead of driving straight toward the Jordanian border, the taxi has detoured and is entering into Jericho. And I suddenly find myself in front of the mutated form of the border that I had crossed four years previously.

The first time I arrived here from Jordan, I first met up with the Jordanian police and then with the Israeli forces, assisted by a Palestinian police unit. Now the Palestinians have been moved away from the border and have set up a sham border of a non-existent state on a piece of land measuring 150 by 500 feet.

A barrier appears in front of our vehicle. We get out of the taxi and climb onto a bus that stops again after a few yards. Some Palestinian policemen climb on to check documents and luggage. The bus starts again, and stops a few yards later. They make us get off. We pick up our suitcases from practically the same spot where we made our entry.

The Palestinian border is like a service station that leads nowhere. I'm flooded by a sense of overwhelming sadness. The idea of Palestinian sovereignty appears to have achieved its final form in this place: a sovereignty exercised over a miniscule plot of land inside of which all procedures are complied with for a border crossing into… nowhere. The real border is 5 miles away. I'm flabbergasted: the police and the people in transit diligently recite their parts in this puppet theater. Everybody knows that it's make-believe, but no one objects to it.

Back in the bus, we leave for the real border, presided over this time solely by Israelis. As an Italian citizen in a taxi, I could have reached the border directly. Sandi and Tala, as Palestinians,

had no way of avoiding this sham performance.

The trip from Bethlehem to Amman – less than 125 miles – normally takes more than eight hours. The puppet-theater border crossing has radically disheartened me. The day will come, I say to myself, when the Palestinians will climb out of their rundown buses, their overcrowded, stuffy group vans, and with a resigned but peaceful expression, say to the Israelis: “Fine, you win. This cannot be the dream of a Palestinian state that we nurtured for so many years. We don’t want a fake state, a sham border. We simply want to live and move around freely like you. We give up on our state. We just want our rights.”

We continue our journey, this time in the direction of the real border. After hours of waiting to be able to enter the border zone, the moment comes to show our documents. Many Westerners with privileged passports do not understand the anxiety of people who are faced with the potential of being sent back. The Palestinian travel document is once again the paroxysmal expression of this control device. It’s a travel document, not a passport, and it doesn’t even specify a nationality. I’ve seen policemen at the airport stare at it with puzzled expressions and ask, “What the heck is this?” Whoever thought up this document didn’t have the courage to write the word ‘Palestinian’ in the box for ‘Nationality’. The adjective ‘Palestinian’ is becoming like the adjective ‘Jewish’: a lot of people are too scared to even pronounce it. Bad consciences.

Even though Tala is registered on my passport, for the Israelis and Palestinians she’s Palestinian, so she has to follow the same route as Sandi, a different one from mine. I don’t object to this, I just ask the Israeli soldier to allow me to go with them, to let me follow the procedure reserved to Palestinians. I want to give up my Westerner privileges, air conditioning, cleanliness and cold drinks, in order to accompany my family into the crowded buildings and hallways reserved to Palestinians.

The soldier informs me that this will not be possible and that I have to stick to the procedures for tourists. A confused jumble of questions comes to my mind. By accepting this treatment, to what

extent do I make myself an accomplice to this madness? Why do all the things I've read not come to my aid, preventing me from going crazy with rage? To stop myself from dehumanising the soldiers standing before me, I imagine that Nadav, Eyal, Ravit, Runit and many other Israeli friends of mine might very well be disguised behind their uniforms and rifles. All I know is that I give in and, dazed, I watch Sandi and Tala walk away from me.

I enter into the area for non-Palestinians. Air conditioning and men in Bermuda shorts. I feel ashamed of myself for giving up and accepting this privileged treatment. Me, here, with the tourists and them, over there, hoping not to be sent home. Stunned, I obey the orders issued to me: pay here, open there, get up here, go there, step down, step up, sit down…

After a few hours, I cross the bridge. I'm in Jordan. I immediately start looking for the Palestinian exit, but it's not easy to find. The building is built in such a way as to prevent human traffic flows from ever meeting up, like in hospitals, where areas and routes for healthy people and patients are kept rigorously separated. Breathlessly, I search among lazy Jordanian policemen and sweaty tourists for the door connecting the area reserved to Palestinians with the area for everyone else. I finally find the door, and before opening it, I feel like Jim Carrey in *The Truman Show* when he discovers the hidden door in the painted blue skyscape that may possibly eject him into the real world.

**Connect – Disconnect**

**Connection**

Contemporary cities and territories have been depicted by many scholars and the media as fluid spaces, without borders, lacking an exterior, and continuously traversed by flows.[1]

[1] The rhetoric of a world with no more borders and of the network in particular is the favorite rhetoric of economic reporting.

Interconnected global cities form an autonomous transnational space. [2] There exists a rhetoric and an imaginary tied to globalisation, to the new freedom of movement, and to the elimination of distances made possible by new electronic and mechanical infrastructures.

These representations of the urban and territorial reality seem to literally implode when things fail to go as they are supposed to, when something goes wrong. The system of representation thus plunges into crisis, revealing all its inadequacy and bias. Today, albeit with some effort, a widespread awareness is growing that, parallel to the proliferation of new computer, financial and economic networks, the number of borders, barriers and checkpoints for the protection of the networks is being multiplied.

While flows become ever more intangible, the fortification of the physical space is accelerating. This has created a territorial system in which the *archipelago* (the smooth space of flows) and the *enclave* (the spaces of exception) cohabit.[3] These two figures inhabit the same space, but their cohabitation is asymmetrical. On the one hand, we have an elite that is managing the space of flows, living in an archipelago-type world which it perceives as the only world, with no exterior to it; while on the other hand, the suspension of the rules of the archipelago creates legal and economic vacuums that make the enclave system a black hole, a shadowy area.

The archipelago is a system of connected islands; enclaves are simply islands.

The archipelago can accommodate both legal and illegal flows inside its space, whereas enclaves have no type of connection: they are isolated by some kind of power that may be internal or external to them, a power they submit to or which they exert.

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[2] Saskia Sassen, *Global Networks, Linked Cities*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002.
[3] For a thorough study of this model, see Alessandro Petti, *Arcipelaghi e enclave. Architettura dell'ordinamento spaziale,* contemporaneo, Bruno Mondadori, 2007. In this article I will focus on the space between different islands, exploring how the sea functions to connect (producing the archipelagos) and to disconnect (producing groups of enclaves). I will attempt to analyse infrastructures not simply as technological and formal artifacts, but also as instruments for the implementation of a socio-spatial project. What we will see is that disconnection from networks,

There is a substantial difference between being enclosed and enclosing oneself: it is what distinguishes a concentration camp from a luxury community.
In his book *The Capsular Civilization,*[4] Lieven De Cauter claims that gated communities and immigrant camps or detention centres are mirror images of each other, in the same way tourist areas and ghettos are. The camp is the counterpart of the fortress.

A fortress is an exclusion machine, while a camp is a reclusion machine.

De Cauter thus points out that in order to reflect on cities and territories at the same time, we must think in dual terms: entertainment versus control, opening versus isolation. Connection is what makes archipelagos necessary and possible, while disconnection is what creates enclaves.

A group of islands creates an archipelago when relations, or connecting spaces, exist between one island and another, namely, when a space for the flows exists. Manuel Castells[5] asserts that in contemporary cities this space is constituted by flows of information, organisation, capital, images and symbols; thanks to new communication technologies, this flow is able to generate an integrated global network. For Castells, the space of flows is a form of space capable of shaping new urban conditions and a new type of society, *the networked society*. This space is governed by the most affluent members of the elite who live in superconnected cities and spaces, from where they exert enormous power.

> The space of flows…can be described…by the combination of at least three layers of material supports….The first layer, the first material support of the space of flows is actually constituted by a circuit of electronic impulses (microelectronics, telecommunications, computer processing, broadcasting

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in addition to being a failed connection, is also a political choice meant to exclude and contain peoples and territories.
[4] Lieven De Cauter, *The Capsular Civilization. On the City in the Age of Fear,* Nai Publishers, Rotterdam, 2004.
[5] Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.

> systems, and high-speed transportation…). …The second layer of the flow space is constituted by its nodes and hubs. The space of flows is not placeless, although its structural logic is….The third important layer of the space of flows refers to the spatial organization of the dominant, managerial elites (rather than classes).[6]

For Castells, the space of flows is the fruit of technological innovations that have allowed people who are geographically distant to participate in shared social practices. His analysis is therefore predominantly centered on intangible flows. From this point of view, the practices of control and segregation that are exerted on the movement of people in the physical space remain marginal.[7]

The theorists of cyberspace believed that access to new technologies would give life to a world with no more borders or barriers, in which bodies would dematerialise into cyberspace. This vision remained a utopia, belied by the dramatic evidence of billions of people who are excluded both from access to the network and from free circulation in a world presumed to be without borders. Quite to the contrary, movements of bodies in physical space have become subject to ironhanded control on the part of government and private entities. The consequences of these developments have yet to be explored. The illusion of a world without fences has been replaced by a reality in which the spaces of freedom have been occupied by an evolving form of power that has traced out the passage, foreseen by Foucault, from a disciplinary society to a society of control. Apropos of this, Deleuze writes:

> The control society is a type of society in which mechanisms of control become increasingly "democratic"... The normalizing devices of discipline

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[6] Ibid., p. 412-415.

[7] Castells's analysis of the space of flows is largely based on research work conducted during the 1980s, summarised and developed in his book *The Informational City. Information, Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process* (1989). This subsequently emerged as his theory on the space of flows presented in *The Network Society*. His theory is very much a product of the 'cultural climate' of the Eighties: faith in the digital revolution, the end of history, the end of the nation-state, cyberspace, and so forth. Some time later, partly in response to changes on the geopolitical scene, Castells revisited these ideas.

> that act within our shared everyday practices are intensified and generalized in societies of control; unlike disciplinary societies, however, this control extends well beyond the structural places of social institutions by means of a free-floating network.[8]

In societies of control we are continually monitored and our movements are systematically recorded and filed away 'by means of a free-floating network': we are all potential criminals.

If Foucault discerned the spatial model of the disciplinary society in the prison and panopticon, where deviant behavior was brought into line with normalcy, in the control society, in addition to creating normalising institutions and penetrating the very nature of the body (digital fingerprinting and DNA testing are obvious examples), power invades the entire territory. Airports, streets, public squares, stations, houses, offices, resort villages and sports centres are increasingly subject to widespread and thorough surveillance. No longer targeted, surveillance has become generalised.

The space of flows, both tangible and intangible, is the favoured space where power exercises its control. Occupation of these places is what puts an elite in a position of dominion. If, on the one hand, the elite is able to exchange information and travel faster, on the other hand the majority are denied the universally recognised right of movement and residence. It is from this point of view, from the point of view of controlling flows, that this analysis is conducted.

In order to explode the contradictions of a space of flows whose access is fortified, controlled and monitored, this study will focus on the tangible displacements of bodies in space rather than on the intangible flows of information, finance and goods. An approach that investigates the regimes imposed on movements of bodies in space has the advantage of making the forms of power explicit. This perspective was also suggested by Castells:

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[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2000.

> The space of flows does not infuse the entire field of human experience in the network society. The vast majority of people in both advanced and traditional societies live in places, and, therefore perceive their own space as a place-based space.[9]

His theory of urbanism in the information age[10] posits that cities are simultaneously structured and destructured by competing logics: the logic of the space of flows on the one hand (which link individual places into a network connecting people and activities in distant geographical locations), and the logic of the space of place (experiences and activities within the confines of the nearby territory) on the other hand. Castells believes that spaces of place are redundant and superfluous in the organisation of the space of flows and power.

This the reason, in Castells view, that they have no capacity *per se* to construct a critical discourse on contemporary cities and society. Spaces of place are seen as black holes. What happens in them and how they work is not revealed in Castells's theory.

The point of departure, rather, should be a perspective that comes from within the places where the legal foundations of cities and states are instituted, where relations between the city and its inhabitants are created, where the borders between a territory and a people are established. These are the spaces of exception, places that are anything but marginal to understanding how power is exercised over space.

In my analysis of the spatial form of the archipelago-enclave[11], I stated that the territorial model of the Occupied Territories is based precisely on controlling the rights of movement and residence. The archipelago-enclave model has put into crisis the notion of citizenship which had defined the political relationship of the individual with the city ever since the classical age.

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[9] Manuel Castells, 'Space of Flows, Space of Places. Materials for a Theory of Urbanism in the Information Age', in Stephen Graham (ed.), *The Cybercities Reader*, Routledge, London, 2003, pp. 82-93.
[10] Ibid., p. 485.
[11] See footnote 3.

In the era of globalisation, citizenship is no longer a factor of inclusion and equality that goes beyond religious and racial belonging. It has become an element of exclusion and discrimination, the device an elite uses to manage global flows of people, in complete contradiction with the proclaimed universality and equality of the so-called fundamental rights, especially those of freedom of movement and residence. Inclusion-exclusion and connection-disconnection are logics according to which cities were constructed and continue to be constructed.

**Disconnection**

From the perspective of control over infrastructure network flows, while these methods act to reinforce connections, they are also the instrument by which entire parts of territories and populations are controlled, filtered and segregated. A space of mobility and flows for some always implies the existence of barriers for others. The creation of an infrastructure network presupposes a more or less conscious spatial and social ideology.

Disconnection from the networks generates a fragmented territory consisting of a set of separate, isolated enclaves that are segregated and suspended. The infrastructure network is the element that serves to enhance the connection of some and the disconnection of others. This apparently banal feature has been underestimated by modernist urban planners, for whom modern infrastructure networks were the support for a harmonious spatial and social order. In their conception, the modern infrastructure network swept away the old hierarchies and founded a new, standardised social order. The use of the automobile in Frank Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City, for example, allowing residents to move around in the boundless City-Region, was a genuine vehicle of freedom.

The road network, and the electric, water, sewer and communication grids were imagined to reach everyone in the same manner and at the same cost. The virtually standardised and uniform modernist infrastructure was constructed by the state in the collective interest. This ideology,

which in some ways continues to survive even today, was put into crisis by two factors: on the one hand, the inadequacy of the rational paradigm, including planning, which was too rigid and bureaucratic to include the new dynamics of the urban agglomerations; on the other hand, the privatisation of the infrastructure networks, aimed at connecting the most affluent and most lucrative islands.

This is the process of infrastructural subdivision and spatial fragmentation that Graham and Marvin described as 'splintering urbanism'.[12] This process, begun in the 1970s, has by now transformed a large number of cities. New urban areas such as shopping centres, amusement parks, residential complexes, airports, conference centres and resort villages are connected through a selective infrastructure network capable of forming an autonomous, privatised space, putting the notion of public space and the very idea of city into crisis. The concept of bypassing is fundamental for understanding how disconnection functions in the spatial model of the Occupied Territories.

**Bypassing**

With the collapse of the modernist ideal, private networks providing potentially high-efficiency services for their customers were developed. Fibre optic networks, superhighways, tunnels and bridges, and new energy networks tend to bypass the old networks or be superimposed on top of them, connecting some parts of the territory and ignoring others that are less appetising from a business point of view. For the places and people that are bypassed by the new infrastructure systems, all that remains are the public networks or informal mechanisms.

The bypass exists in all infrastructure networks, but it is most obvious in highway systems. Today, the highway system is redirecting the development of residential settlements and our way of moving around in space. After leaving our fortified garages in our cars, we drive down

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[12] Graham, Stephen; Marvin, Simon. *Splintering urbanism. Networked infrastructures, technological mobilities and urban condition*, Routledge, London and New York 2001

armoured routes, taking us to protected office areas or shopping centres.

In the 1990s, privatisation radicalised technologies of control, differentiating various groups based on the power they held over the space. This has created a territory that can be crossed at different speeds depending on the person's income, and national, ethnic, and social belonging. Electronic devices such as sensors and closed-circuit video cameras watch over access points and monitor toll payments.

Surveillance goes hand in hand with exclusion. Only the wealthiest users can bypass the congested public streets and gain access to the privileged road networks. The same roadways that were seen as devices for progress and modernisation in the visions of Frank Lloyd Wright and Corbusier are revealed as instruments of control and segregation.

An investigation of the tangible flows of people, rather than intangible flows of information and finance, must be given priority in order to bring to light regimes of control over movements. It is for this reason that this study has chosen to focus on the functioning of the highway infrastructure, which physically connects and disconnects entire segments of the population and territory. The layout of a street can have the same importance as a border; it can include or exclude, unite or divide, create belonging or estrangement.

This point of view is radically opposed to the perspective that bases its analysis on the rhetoric of a world without borders where nation-states no longer exercise any power. In our view, old and new borders are being reinforced in both contemporary society and space, and nation-state politics appear to be anything but worn out. A look at the regime of control imposed on our everyday movements in space is enough to make this clear.

## Asymmetric Permeability of Spaces: The Highway Networks in Palestine-Israel

### From *bypass roads…*

The Israeli colonies in the Occupied Territories are strategic points for controlling the territory.[13] As points of control dispersed across a 'hostile territory', the settlements could not function unless they were connected to each other and to Israel through a continuous and uniform infrastructure. The link between colony and infrastructure can be viewed as the binary control code at work in the West Bank.

The combination of these two elements generates what Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper defines as 'the matrix of control'.[14] If we compare the map of the West Bank territory with the plan of a prison, we note that: a) the prison officers' guard posts correspond to the colonies situated on the hills; b) the corridors that allow for the cells to be policed correspond to the highway networks that bypass the Palestinian villages; c) the cells where the prisoners are incarcerated correspond to the villages inhabited by the Palestinians.[15] In addition to linking settlements, the highway system blocks development of Palestinian villages, creating borders and barriers between communities that at one time were connected. According to B'Tselem report,

> Contrary to the customary purpose of roads, which are a means to connect people with places, the routes of the roads that Israel builds in the West Bank are at times intended to achieve the opposite purpose. Some of the new roads in the West Bank were planned to place a physical barrier to stifle Palestinian urban development. These roads prevent the natural joining of communities and creation of a contiguous Palestinian built-up area in areas in which Israel wants to maintain control, either for military

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[13] See Benvenisti Meron and Khayat Sholomo, *The West Bank and Gaza Atals, The Jerusalem Post*, Jerusalem, 1988; Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land*, Verso, London and New York, 2007; Ariel Handel's article in this volume.
[14] Jeff Halper, "The matrix of control", in <http://www.icahd.org/eng/>
[15] Jeff Halper used the analogy between a prison plan and the map of the West Bank specifically to deconstruct the theory of the "generous offer" that Barak made to Yasser Arafat in 2000 by offering him ninety-four percent of the West Bank. Halper claims in his article that only two percent of a prison space is required to control the inmates. By maintaining a modest six percent of the territory, Israel would thus have continued to control all the borders, as well as the underground and the air space of the Palestinian Territories.

> reasons or for settlement purposes.[16]

This strategy of controlling the flows and using the roads as barriers has its roots in the history of the occupation of the West Bank. Immediately after the 1967 war, in addition to the construction of Jewish outposts, a highway system allowing the circulation of military and civilian vehicles was needed to control the occupied territory. According to Benvenisti and Khayat, during the decade of 1967-77, the highway networks were planned primarily along the north-south axis. Since there was no desire for integration with the Israeli highway system, no roads running east-west were planned. Attention was focused particularly on consolidating Highway 90, which runs from north to south along the border with Jordan and is easily reached from Jerusalem via Highway 1. According to the military strategists, in the event of an Arab invasion, this would have allowed military vehicles to easily reach the border and respond to the attack.

During the next decade, with the presentation of the new master plan for the settlements of Judea and Samaria, the geopolitical strategy for constructing the networks changed.

> The Settlement Master Plan for 1983-1986...expressly states that one of the primary considerations in choosing the site to establish settlements is to limit construction in Palestinian villages.[17]

The plan envisaged clearing distances between one hundred and thirty and four hundred feet for the construction of new highway routes, well over the lengths area required for the planned traffic speed and density. For major and regional roads, the clearance distance reached up to 2,000 feet. This brought the total of the area occupied by the infrastructure network to 91,923 acres, almost the entire built area of the West Bank (in 1987 the built area covered 106,255 acres).

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[16] B'Tselem, "Forbidden Roads, Israel's Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank", August 2004, pp. 7-8.
[17] Ibid., p. 7.

Given these proportions, it seems clear that the objective of the plan was not to connect Palestinian villages but rather to build a matrix that would cage them in. The decision to dedicate such a large area to the infrastructure was a strategic expedient to physically and bureaucratically curb Palestinian expansion. The clearance distances specified in the plan allowed for the demolition of a significant number of houses. For security reasons, the new Palestinians houses could not be built less than 1.86 miles from highways. This regulation did not apply to Jewish settlements, which were built based on special urban plans.

The new master plan envisaged an integrated network between the colonies and Israel and at the same time introduced regulations designed to restrict almost any growth of the Palestinian villages.

Many objections were raised, although they were ignored, while the approval procedures remained unclear. Although the plan was never formally approved, based on the regulations contained in it, the occupation forces went ahead with the expropriations and demolitions needed for the construction of roads reserved for the exclusive use of Israeli settlements.

The plan included the design of an infrastructure network that connected the West Bank settlements with the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Driven by lower rents, state incentives, and the possibility of living far from the most congested areas, many Israeli residents decided to go and live in the new West Bank colonies, which were well-served by a new and efficient highway grid. During the peace process in the 1990s, this logic reached its apex. According to B'Tselem report,

> Starting in 1993, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Oslo I) and the redeployment of Israeli Defence Forces to the West Bank, the bypass road system gained momentum. In 1995, new road construction reached its peak. Israel began the construction of over

> 62 miles of roads in the West Bank alone, more than 20 percent of all roadwork performed in that year.[18]

The new extensive highway grid provided Israel with spatial control over the West Bank. The bypass road system is designed to link the Israeli colonies, cutting off Palestinian villages, and to effectively incorporate the West Bank into Israel proper. The flows are under direct control of Israeli, which directs them through permanent and temporary checkpoints, barriers and military patrols. For a Palestinian traveller, there is no possibility whatsoever to go from one city to another without passing through one or more checkpoints. The matrix of bypass roads that circle the major Palestinian cities is a formidable straitjacket.

Most of the highways were constructed on land belonging to Palestinians. The expropriations carried out by Israel in the Occupied Territories since 1967 were, and continue to be, an instrument of colonisation and control.

Before the 1990s, expropriations were carried out for 'military reasons'. Once the geopolitic situation changed, so did the pretexts for the expansion of new settlements and the construction of new roads. During the Oslo peace process, Israel expropriated in the name of the 'public interest', claiming that the bypass roads were also useful to Palestinians. During the second Intifada, the expropriations were continued for 'security reasons'.[19] The line between military and civil law, between standards and exceptions does not exist. From time to time, to produce a formal justification, a space of legislative ambiguity is created.[20]

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[18] Ibid.

[19] The expropriations occurred, depending on the cases, for military reasons or for the good of the population in the particular places, in compliance with the laws in force prior to the occupation (Land Law: Acquisition for Public Purpose, Law No. 2 of 1953), or through the suspension of any of the regulations implemented for security reasons. The instrumental use of ambiguity and suspension of rules is also evident in the construction of roads created between colonies in the B areas, only subsequently legitimised through military orders.

[20] In the Occupied Territories, an Israeli Civil Administration is in charge to which Palestinians have to apply for construction and work permits, and so forth. The heads of this administration are not civilians; they are members of

By observing the transformations of the regimes imposed on the use of roads in the Occupied Territories, the evolution of the strategies aimed at the control and surveillance of undesired population flows becomes clear. Over time, although built in the name of ‘public interest’, the bypass roads that allow Israeli colonies to bypass the Palestinian villages became increasingly exclusive in character, transforming into ‘sterile roads’ – Israel military jargon for roads that have been decontaminated of Palestinians.

**…to *sterile roads***

Although the bypass roads were not built in the interest of Palestinian cities and villages, whose growth they served to block, before the second Intifada most of the roads were accessible to virtually everyone. Their use by Palestinians was limited, however, by a number of factors, both large and small: lack of entry and exit roads near Palestinian cities; almost complete lack of road signs indicating Palestinian towns; public transportation stops restricted solely to Israeli colonists and soldiers.

When the second Intifada began, at the end of 2000, Israel drastically cut Palestinian access to many of the roads in the West Bank, including various bypass roads. It is a regime of arbitrary and unwritten prohibitions, categorised by B’Tselem, the Israeli association for human rights, as follows: a) roads that Palestinians are completely forbidden to use; b) roads that can be used by Palestinians only if they have a special permit that is extremely difficult to obtain[21] and with a restricted use of vehicles;[22] c) roads whose access is controlled by checkpoints, some permanent and others temporary.

The regime is implemented by officers of the Israeli security forces through verbal orders and

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the military who are subject to military orders. This is an example of how the line between military and civil administration is inexistent.

[21] As of July 2004, only 3,412 Palestinians from among the 2.3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank hold this special permit, known as a ‘Special Movement Permit at Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria’.

[22] In actuality, Palestinians cannot travel from one city to another in their own vehicle.

has dramatic effects on mobility. Palestinians caught using a road forbidden to them or lacking a permit risk being arrested and having their vehicle confiscated. B'Tselem notes regarding this regime of prohibitions that:

> The policy is entirely based on verbal orders given to soldiers in the field. The strongest proof of the regime is the local population's awareness of its existence. Palestinians have almost completely ceased using many of these roads, even when entry to the road is not blocked by physical obstacles or staffed checkpoints. In response to questioning by B'Tselem, the IDF let it be known that an order from 1970 granted the authority to restrict travel and movement "to anyone who is an authorized military commander."[23]

This regime of prohibitions is enforced by the use of permanent and temporary checkpoints, barriers that block the roads, and military patrols. In many cases, travel on the roads using one's own vehicle is forbidden. This is why, in order to be able to travel, Palestinians use group transport vehicles that shuttle between one roadblock and another.

B'Tselem estimates that there are seventeen roads whose access is completely prohibited to Palestinian vehicles (about 75 miles); ten roads whose access is partially prohibited (150 miles); and fourteen roads whose use is restricted (225 miles). It must be kept in mind that these distances are relative to a territory with an average width of 30 miles and an average length of 190 miles. Forbidding access to even a few miles of a road can mean causing entire areas to be disconnected.

### Travel from A to B[24]

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[23] Order Regarding Defense Regulations (No. 378), 5730-1970. In B'Tselem, "Forbidden Roads", op. cit., p. 42.
[24] The contents of this section are adapted from a text published in a different form in "The Road Map", an article written for *Multiplicity* by Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti and Salvatore Porcaro and which appeared in "Equilibri", no. 2, August 2004. It is based on a video installation called "The Road Map" by *Multiplicity* (Stefano Boeri,

In January 2003 we conducted a field study whose results, presented in the form of a video installation, reveal the effects of the regime imposed on the sterile roads.

We conducted the following experiment on two different days: the first day we traveled along the route taken by an Israeli colonist to go from the Kiriat Arba colony to the Kedumim colony; the next day we traveled along the route taken by a Palestinian to reach the city of Nablus, starting from Hebron. Both trips start and finish at the same latitude.

The first trip, in an Israeli taxi, took one hour and five minutes; the second, using various Palestinian group taxis, took five hours and twenty minutes. The difference in the trip times was due to several factors: along the route taken by the Palestinian traveller, we had to pass through a number of checkpoints, cover some distances on foot, and change taxis; whereas for the route the Israeli traveller took, we used the bypass roads and passed through the checkpoints without being stopped.

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Maddalena Bregani, Maki Gherzi, Matteo Ghidoni, Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti, Salvatore Porcaro, Anniina Koivu, Francesca Recchia, Eduardo Staszowsky). Fieldwork and video recording were done by Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti and Salvatore Porcaro.

Israeli route: By-pass road A60 South.

Palestinian route: The old city of Hebron.

Israeli route: Tunnel by-passing the Palestinian city of Beit-Jala.

Palestinian route: Avoiding checkpoint.

What follows is our logbook of the two trips.

Palestinian trip From Hebron to Nablus: 60 miles. Total time: 5 hours 20 minutes.

*January 13, 2003. We leave from the historical center of Hebron in the H1 special zone, where Palestinians are under a semipermanent curfew. On foot, we head toward the first checkpoint separating the historical center from the rest of the city. We take a group taxi which drives us as far as the limits of Area B. The road is blocked by a barrier built by Israel to stop vehicles with white Palestinian license plates from entering Bypass Road 60. We get out of the taxi and pass through the barriers on foot. On the other side, we find a bus reserved to Palestinians that goes as far as Bethlehem. During the trip, the bus stops to take on other passengers. There are no cars with white license plates on this part of the road; the bus is the only vehicle allowed to*

*travel along the bypass road from Hebron to Bethlehem.*

*We stop in front of a checkpoint at the gates of Bethlehem. The soldiers search the bus. Shortly afterwards, we get off the bus and pass through the checkpoint on foot. On the other side, we find other group taxis which we use to continue our trip. We cannot proceed north using Bypass Road 60, which bypasses Bethlehem going toward Jerusalem, because it is forbidden to Palestinians who do not have the special entry permit. We are forced to detour toward the south-west. At Beit Sahur, we change taxis again. We go down a secondary street that is particularly dangerous, with lots of checkpoints. Whether or not we'll be able to take this route is uncertain; we come across various Israeli army jeeps that are patrolling the roads. The taxi drivers call each other on their mobile phones to exchange information on which roads are passable and free of military patrols. Taking various winding roads, we get to Al 'Ubeidiya. The taxi driver asks us to get out here because there's a mobile checkpoint up ahead that he can't go around with the car. Following the other passengers, we go around it on foot and further on, 500 feet in the distance, we find other taxi drivers who are waiting to take us to the next checkpoint.*

*We reach Abu Dis. The taxi stops next to huge reinforced concrete retaining blocks that divide Abu Dis from East Jerusalem. Here we find other taxis that continue on toward the north. They confirm that we can get at least as far as Ramallah. But they don't know if we can get any further than that. They tell us that once we get to Ramallah we'll find out if there are any taxis for Nablus. During the trip, we leave Area B near Ma'ale Admim, taking Road 1 until it intersects with Road 458. Here, we see a lot of cars with yellow Israeli license plates and group taxis with white Palestinian plates. We get to the Khalandia checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah. At the checkpoint, we find a taxi for Nablus. We go back along a section of the road to be able to hook up with Bypass Road 60 going north. We are surrounded by a large number of colonist cars.*

*We continue our trip without stopping. Various colonies come into view as we drive past them. When the road narrows and becomes unpaved, there are no more colonies to be seen. Long*

*before reaching Nablus, the taxi abandons the main road to take a secondary street running through an olive orchard. We ask the taxi driver why he doesn't continue along the road that leads directly to Nablus. He answers that further on there's a checkpoint that you can't get through. We go on through the olive trees until we come out again onto the bypass road. We drive along it for a short distance until coming to the Nablus entry checkpoint. We cross it on foot, showing our European passports to the soldiers, who are very surprised to find us there. Many of the Palestinians are forced to go back. Once we've crossed the checkpoint, we take a new taxi which drives us to Nablus. The taxi drivers in Nablus tell us that we can't continue north because there are no passable roads. The army has closed all the roads today, they say. But after waiting for a few minutes, one taxi driver claims that he knows which roads to take to get around the checkpoint. We get into his taxi and take a dirt road, in the middle of the countryside, until the taxi driver tells us to get out before a checkpoint that will lead us back onto a normal road. In the distance, soldiers shout at us with rifles pointed that no one is allowed through here. Our journey ends here.*

Israeli route: By-pass road A60 South.

Palestinian route: Communication between drivers on possible control and checkpoints.

Israeli trip. From Kiriat Arba to Kedumim: 60 miles. Total time: 1 hour 5 minutes.

*January 14, 2003. From the colony of Kiriat Arba, with a yellow-plated Israeli taxi, we start off on Bypass Road 60. We pass through the first checkpoint we come to without stopping. We note that some of the sections of the road we're on are the same ones we traveled along in the*

*Palestinian bus. There are no cars with white Palestinian license plates. We pass through the checkpoint before arriving at the entry to Jerusalem. We bypass Bethlehem through a tunnel and a viaduct. In some points, the road is protected from stone-throwing by barriers. The bypass road literally climbs across the Palestinian village of Beit Jalla, passing over it like a bridge. We drive through the traffic for Jerusalem, continuing northwards. At the checkpoint, we are stopped for a control. After a few questions, we are allowed to continue. We proceed to the colony of Kedumin, where our journey finishes.*

Israeli route: By-pass road A60 North.

Palestinian route: Changing taxi at Qalandia checkpoint.

Israeli route: By-pass road A60 North near the colony.

Palestinian route: Crossing the countryside to avoid checkpoint.

The regime of prohibitions instituted ‘for security reasons’ effectively restricts the freedom of

movement of three and a half million people on the basis of their national belonging.[25]

Similar sorts of practices have also been put into effect inside Israeli territory. The Trans-Israel Highway, a 220-mile toll highway built in the most densely populated area of Israel, has become the main axis of the matrix of control.

**The Trans-Israel Highway**

Highway 6, the Trans-Israel Highway, was officially completed in January 2004. It extends from the border with Lebanon, in the north, to the city of Be'er Sheva in the south. The roads that traverse Israel and the West Bank from east to west all intersect with it.[26] By observing Palestine-Israel from the point of view of its infrastructure network, its space – seemingly separated by walls and borders – is seen to be completely unified. The islands of the colonial archipelago in the Occupied Territories are joined together and connected with Israel through an efficient and continuous highway system. The highway runs parallel to the *wall* for a long section, showing that the space of flows and apparatuses of exclusion are complementary. The *wall* acts as a membrane that allows some flows to pass while blocking others; together with Highway 6, it forms a single system capable of including and excluding, connecting and disconnecting. This logic does not apply solely to the West Bank: it also invades the territory of Israel.

> The government's long-standing and explicit policies of "Judaizing" the Galilee...to ensure a Jewish majority here, and preventing territorial

[25] Ibid. "The regime, based on the principle of separation through discrimination, bears clear similarities to the racist apartheid regime that existed in South Africa until 1994."
[26] The Trans-Samaria Highway (Road 5) starting from the coast near Ramat, which passes through the settlement of Ariel to reach the Jordanian Valley; Road 45, which starts from Modin, passing through the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, to reach the Jordanian valley; Road 7, which starts from Ashdod, passing through the settlements of Etzion and Ma'ale Adumim, to reach the Jordanian Valley. The north-south highways in Israel, Highway 2, Highway 4 and the newly-built Highway 6; expressways Highway 60 and 90 in the Occupied Territories, together with the east-west routes listed above, form the main axes of the large-scale grid, flanked by a secondary road system that completes the matrix.

> contiguity between cities, towns and villages will be furthered by the highway's construction... The Trans-Israel Highway will require massive expropriations from Palestinian communities in Israel, while limiting their natural expansion through highway and Jewish settlement construction that primarily serves the Jewish population. Eighty-five percent of the land to be confiscated for the road's construction is from Arab landowners in a state where only 3% of the land is Arab and remains unconfiscated.[27]

The highway was constructed by a private company that obtained special status through a law voted into existence by the *knesset* in 1995 that allows it to confiscate land. Public interest is thus contracted out directly to a private company. The legal status of these companies is ambiguous. Public and private functions are mentioned depending on the contexts the companies are involved in.

The highway is equipped with a 'free flow' toll system which eliminates the need for the driver to stop at the booth. When the vehicle enters the highway, it is scanned and photographed by an optic surveillance system. The vehicle owner's data is collected by the private company through direct access to the Ministry of Transportation databases. The owner receives the bill for the amount owed directly at his or her home. Failure to pay can result in the owner's driving license being withdrawn, and, in more serious cases, the private highway police can confiscate the vehicle.

**Epilogue: The Diffusion of the Model**

Practices for control and surveillance of the flows that we have analysed so far are not specific to the Palestinian Occupied Territories. They appear in other geographical contexts – from Australia to East Asia to North America – and they take form in various ways: in the functioning

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[27] Jeff Halper, "The Road to Apartheid", in "News from Within", Alternative Information Center, vol. XVI, no. 5, Jerusalem/Bethlehem, May 2000, p. 3.

of the toll-road bypass freeways in the large urban agglomerations of Los Angeles, Toronto, and Melbourne; in the use of highways as 'sanitary cordons' used to divide new settlements for the emerging classes from the informal settlements of Istanbul, Jakarta and Manila; in the use of pedestrian bypasses in office centre complexes.

Alongside the privatisation that has taken place in many sectors during recent years, the system of private toll highways, ensuring more efficient and speedy travel, has quickly taken on a rapidly growing role.

In many cities, private highways have been superimposed directly on top of the old congested public transport network. The *Riverside SR 91 Freeway* in Los Angeles, *Highway 407* in Toronto, and the *CityLink Project* in Melbourne are highway routes built as networks for bypassing crowded public streets.

New major roadways in Istanbul, Jakarta and Manila are used as genuine sanitary cordons that divide residential neighborhoods from the slums. This new generation of highways is used to bypass urban areas that are considered unsafe, and to restrict the growth of undesirable populations.

The new toll systems that are built into the highway routes function as devices for control, for cataloging and for automatic surveillance. Today, high technology has enabled control and surveillance to reach levels of invasiveness and pervasiveness that are unprecedented.

*SR 91 Freeway*, *Road 407* and *Transurban CityLink* are the names of the new bypass road networks built in three major cities: Los Angeles, Toronto and Melbourne. They are toll highways built to bypass the overcrowded public roadways that use electronic control systems for entry and exit points so that drivers are freed from having to stop at the toll booth. Some have toll fares that vary depending on the time of travel and the traffic flow. The construction companies that built them offer reserved spaces for paying customers who want to get across the

city quickly.

The *Transurban CityLink* in Melbourne, inaugurated in 1999, is 14 miles long and links the most affluent neighborhoods with the downtown area and the airport. Offering faster travel times, toll highways are capable of determining the lines along which future expansion of the settlements will develop. Given their size, this type of privatised space, which is increasingly occupying the lands of the large conurbations, puts the very notion of public space into discussion.

> Projects like the *CityLink* can become pivotal in determining the evolution of a city's form because of the fact that they are structural and tend to set the agenda of what sort of urban space is being created for future generations. At issue is the future of public space itself, in its social, technical and aesthetic forms. This is true from the point of view of by-passing of traditional agora like markets and the parking-based streetscapes, to the further privileging of the super-regulated private spaces of shopping complexes, another cocoon for which the freeways is the link.[28]

The creation of tollway spaces to travel from one area of the city to another contributes to the fragmentation of the territory: financial centres, luxury residences, shopping centres, and theme parks are the islands connected by toll networks that bypass spaces and populations in the archipelago of colonies found in major conurbations.

As we know, highway routes are not exclusively spaces for flows. They can also be sanitary cordons that separate affluent neighborhoods from the growth of slums.

In Istanbul, in the wake of a period of economic and political renewal, new settlements for the

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[28] David Holmes, "Cybercommuting on an Information Superhighway: the Case of Melbourne's CityLink", in Stephen Graham (ed.), *The Cybercities Reader*, op. cit., p. 177.

emerging class have sprung up. They offer 'Western lifestyles', social uniformity, comfort and security from crime, and refuge from the multiethnic, chaotic, polluted city. Esenkent and Bogazkoy are two postmodern-style settlements built west of the city, composed of luxurious apartments furnished with swimming-pools and gardens. They are separated by informal villages with houses constructed willy-nilly along the highway routes that mark out the new class and identity confines inside the metropolis.[29]

The same highways that were considered instruments of progress and modernisation in the modernist ideology have become obstructions and barriers in Istanbul, blocking the growth of informal settlements. For Caldeira, the instruments of modernist planning have ironically been used opposite to how they were conceived. [30] The separation between pedestrian and vehicular traffic, which for modernism represented a victory for human health, is seen in Istanbul to be a strategy for prohibiting improper use of the major roadways. The roads are actually sterilised of activities and people who are considered incompatible with the smooth space of flows. Individual private transport has been privileged, excluding the people who use public transport. Similarly, empty urban spaces that in modernist planning were conceived as 'the right distance between buildings' or 'green belts', have been transformed into areas where sculpture-like, fortified 'designer' buildings are located.

The use of highways as a sanitary cordon can also be found in some Asian cities. In the endless suburbs of Jakarta, gated communities, shopping centres and office areas are linked by public or private toll highways. The privileged social classes have moved to the safest and least polluted places in the vast outskirts, abandoning the old unhealthy city, considered to be dangerous, with its poor infrastructures. The major roadways that link the islands of the wealthy bypass the old city centre by soaring over it.[31] In Manila, to build the new toll-road bypass network called the

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[29] Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins, "Modernism and the Millennium: Trial by Space in Istanbul", in "City", no. 8, 1997, pp. 21-36.
[30] Teresa Caldeira, "Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation", in "Public Culture", n. 8, 1996, pp. 303-328.
[31] Abidin Kusno, *City, Space and Globalization: An International Perspective*, Collage of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, 1999, p. 163.

*Metro Manila Skyway*, various informal neighborhoods were demolished, forcing the inhabitants to evacuate. To reinforce exclusive use of the highway network that connects the residential islands, access is forbidden to traditional vehicles. *Jeepneys*, buses and motorcycles are thus forced to use the old streets.

The creation of privatised spaces for flows has even invaded the spaces designed for pedestrians. Raised or underground pedestrian routes have emerged in financial centres and for offices, connecting one building to another by bypassing the city streets. Because of this, the streets and squares that for years symbolised public life have slowly and inexorably been replaced by tunnels and skyway bridges. Access to offices by workers and executives is through tunnels and skywalks, without ever having to step out of their cars other than inside a private parking garage. Entrances to buildings are monitored by video cameras and security staff.

The use of tunnels and pedestrian bridges has compromised the indiscriminate life and use of the public streets. In some business centres, simply going somewhere on foot automatically makes one suspect. The street, a place of human activity and chance encounters has been transformed into a realm of fear and surveillance.

**Postscript on the Society of Control**

During the course he gave at the Collège de France between 1977 and 1978,[32] Foucault investigated the passage of a disciplinary society into a society of security, by which he means *a society in which there is a general economy of power which has the form of, or which is dominated by, the technology of security.* He pays particular attention to the distinction *between discipline and security in their respective ways of dealing with the organization of spatial distributions.* He provides three examples from history.

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[32] Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France (1977-1978), Pelgrave MacMillan, 2007.

The first is the project by Alexandre Le Maître, in which the city is defined in terms of sovereignty; a distinguishing feature of this spatial project is the capital and its role in relation to the rest of the territory. Indeed, the relation between sovereignty and the spatial arrangement is fundamental, since the *city is essentially conceived in relation to the more global dimension of the territory, while the State itself is conceived as an edifice.* Foucault associates this spatial project with the age of law, in which the security mechanism is a both a legal and juridical mechanism. To explain how this mechanism of security functions, he provides the example of the treatment of lepers, who were excluded from the city through laws and regulations.

His second example is the town of Richelieu, based on political thought that was established in the seventeenth century. The town was built using the form of the Roman camp, with the grid embodying the instrument of discipline: hierarchies and relations of power are established through the structural formation of the space. Discipline forms *an empty, closed space*; discipline belongs to the order of construction. Foucault associates this spatial project with the disciplinary age, the institution of the modern legal system. In order to explain how this security mechanism functions, he provides the example of how the plague was treated between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *when the territory was subject to regulations specifying when people could go out and how they should behave at home, prohibiting contact, and requiring them to present themselves to inspectors, and so on.*

The third example is Nantes, where the space was organised to give structure to the problem of hygiene, trade and other types of networks.

> An important problem for towns in the eighteenth century was allowing for surveillance, since the suppression of city walls made necessary by economic development meant that one could no longer close towns in the evening or closely supervise daily comings and goings, so that the insecurity of the towns was increased by the influx of the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers,

> and so on, who might come, as everyone knows, from the country. In other words, it was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad.[33]

This spatial project is associated by Foucault with the age of security. To explain how this mechanism works, he provides the example of smallpox and inoculation practices beginning in the eighteenth century. The fundamental problem

> will not be the imposition of discipline...so much as the problem of knowing how many people are infected with smallpox...the statistical effects on the population in general. In short, it will no longer be the problem of exclusion, as with leprosy, or of quarantine, as with the plague, but of epidemics and the medical campaigns that try to halt epidemic or endemic phenomena.[34]

Nevertheless, Foucault cautions that these three mechanisms can be found in different historical periods and that one influences the other, hence, a complex apparatus of discipline is required to make the mechanisms of security work. They do not follow each other in succession and the forms that emerge do not cause the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Apparatuses of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms; when a technology of security is put into action, for example, it may make use of or, at times, multiply juridical and disciplinary elements.

> In other words, in a period of the deployment of mechanisms of security, it is the disciplinary that sparked off, not the explosion, for there has not

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[33] Ibid., p. 18.
[34] Ibid., p. 10.

been an explosion, but at least the most evident and visible conflicts.[35]

Foucault's schema helps us to arrive at a better understanding of how the wall built by the Israel to encircle Palestinian towns, for example, is indeed a disciplinary mechanism, but one which acquires force only thanks to the security mechanism of the road system. Indeed, if discipline acts in an empty space through isolation, hierarchy and repression, security, on the other hand, allows for a certain amount of circulation, making a division between good and bad circulation, since its objective is not to block flows but to monitor them. Security does not tend, like discipline, to resolve the problem, but, rather, to manage probable events that are only partially controllable while attempting to minimise the risks.

*Discipline gives architectural form to a space and considers the hierarchical and functional distribution of the elements as an essential problem*: I think of how the Israeli guard towers and military camps are organised in the layout of a prison plan, to allow for surveillance even when there is no one observing and guarding from the towers, because all that is needed to influence people's behavior is that the mechanism exist.

*Security seeks, rather, to structure an environment based on a series of possible events or elements that must be regulated within a multi-functional and transformable framework*: I think about how the permanent and mobile checkpoints work, not by attempting to resolve the problem of armed attacks once and for all, but, rather, by reducing their probability, in the same way that taking digital fingerprints for the identity cards issued to Palestinians by the Israelis marks the passage toward a biopolitical power that invades the very nature of humanity, our DNA, transforming a people into a population, into statistical data.

For security, control of the road circulation is equally important as the juridico-legal apparatus and the disciplinary apparatus. The problem is not one of delimiting the territory, as it is for the disciplinary mechanism, or at least not exclusively so. *It is a question of allowing circulation,*

35 Ibid., p 9.

*controlling it, distinguishing between good and bad circulation, and assisting movements, but in such a way as to eliminate the dangers inherent to this circulation.*

I began this piece with a story, attempting to describe the asymmetrical functioning of the roads, for which there are no road maps prohibiting access or even written regulations. What we are dealing with here is not exclusion, a crude but blatant separation like South African apartheid. What we have here is a much more sophisticated regime. The problem is not about imposing a *law that says no* (if such a law exists) but about keeping certain phenomena at bay, within acceptable limits, *by encouraging their progressive self-annihilation. The mechanisms in this type of control become increasingly 'democratic'*. It is for this reason that the sociopolitical future of Palestine-Israel is so relevant to countries that consider themselves to be liberal democracies. It is here that forms of government will come into being which will juxtapose freedom and domination, access and separation, liberalism and occupation.